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Both India and Pakistan have various operational missiles in their inventories. The expanding 
capabilities, marked by significant improvements in payload, range, reliability and accuracy, are not 
only threatening to push the region towards a debilitating arms race, but also have the potential to bring 
the nuclear armed adversaries a step closer towards the deployment of their strategic arsenals. At 
regional level, the inventory and types of missiles increase an escalation of tension between the 
relations of India and Pakistan on the one hand, and between India and China on the other. At global 
level, the developments in the South Asia have serious rather negative implications on the non-
proliferation regime, and encouraging the other states to pursue nuclear and missile programmes. The 
present paper is a moderate attempt to investigate the various security implications of missile 
developments by India and Pakistan on global level in general and on South Asian region in particular. 
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After crossing the nuclear rubicon in May 1998, India and Pakistan, the two countries of 
South Asia, have been embarking on a journey that can only bring greater insecurity, tension, arms race 
and mal-development to the region.
1 
Since then, both the countries have been continuously engaging 
themselves in revising their plans and developing their nuclear systems and delivery means, and little 
real progress has been made to reduce the danger. Threat making, provocative military maneuvers, 
display of offensive force capabilities and large military exercises on borders have   been common in 
the region. Missile flight tests have further raised the concerns of nuclear security and stability more 
seriously. Though, the fragmentary information about India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear forces, operational 
capacity and elements of command and control have emerged but the numbers, readiness status, and 
employment plans for these nuclear delivery capabilities remain murky in many respects. Currently one 
can assume that India has stockpiles of 80-100 nuclear bombs while Pakistan has 90-110.
2
 Besides 
having various aircrafts, India and Pakistan have developed numerous nuclear capable ballistic missiles 
as delivery systems. 
2. Missile Programmes of India and Pakistan  
India has an extensive, largely indigenous ballistic missile programme, including 
infrastructure for both solid and liquid fuelled missiles.
3
 India’s existing missiles for mission against 
Pakistan are of Prithvi and Agni series. India has Prithvi-I with a range of 150 km capable of having 
payload of 1000kg, Prithvi-II with a range of 250 km capable of having a payload of 500 kg and 
Prithvi-III with a range of 350 km. India’s second family of ballistic missiles is the Agni-I, II and III. 
The Agni missiles are designed to extend the reach of Indian nuclear capabilities, particularly to China. 
However, one more variant of Agni, now officially referred to as Agni-I, is specifically designed for 
missions against Pakistan and was tested with a capacity of 1000 kg payload to a range of 700 km.
4
 
India reportedly intends to retrofit its Brahmos adaptation of Russian supplied Yakhont anti-ship, cruise 
missile so that it can be fired either from naval ships or from SU-30 MKI attack aircraft.
5
 This cruise 
missile apparently could be used as a standoff system with either conventional or nuclear weapons.  
Pakistan also has an active missile acquisition and development program since the early 
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1980s. This includes indigenous missile development (based in part on foreign design) as well as the 
reported purchase of M-11 missiles from China in the early 1990s, although, Pakistan and China denied 
these reports. Pakistan has several types of road mobile, nuclear capable ballistic missiles with shorter 
and longer ranges, solid and liquid fueled. The Hatf-I is an indigenous single stage solid propellant 
missile with a range of 60 to 80 km carrying a 500 kg payload. Then there are Hatf-II (Abdali), single 
stage solid fueled missile with a range of 280-300 km and Hatf-III (Ghazani) single stage solid fueled 
(300 km) and Hatf-IV(Shaheen) single stage solid fueled with a range of 600 km. Pakistan’s longer 
range Ghauri-I, single stage with 1000-1500 km range and Ghauri-II, two stage with 2500 km range 
(still in development testing) are liquid fueled missiles that are believed to be based on the North 
Korean “No-Dong” and “Taepo-Dong” missiles, derived originally from Soviet scud technology.  
3. Security Implications 
These missile developments in South Asia have serious security implications on regional as 
well as global level. At regional level, the inventory and types of missiles increase an escalation of 
tension between the relations of India and Pakistan on the one hand, and between India and China on 
the other. At global level, the developments in the South Asia have serious rather negative implications 
on the non-proliferation regime, and encouraging the other states to pursue nuclear and missile 
programmes. Mobility of Missiles during the period of crisis in South Asia also faces various potential 
operational problems which may prompt escalation. The command system requires timely and accurate 
information. At present, the capacity to collect this information is limited. India and Pakistan rely on 
remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), human and electronic intelligence. In the absence of comprehensive 
and accurate intelligence, there is a significant chance that an adversary will misread passive dispersal 
and initiate its own deployment as a result. During a crisis, India and Pakistan could enter into a spiral 
of escalation. One side could interpret the defensive moves by the other as threatening. Steps taken to 
counter the perceived threat would be matched in turn by the other, resulting in further escalation. 
During a condition of heightened tensions, the intelligence organizations in both countries will likely 
have a tendency to report the first indications of activity even if not confirmed. 
 Though wide and flexible dispersal is within the capability of both countries, but if exercised, 
it will underscore the problem of control. Dispersal of missiles during a crisis is understandable within 
the context of preserving survivability. The foremost dilemma facing the command authority will be 
retaining centralized control. Assertive negative control is desirable for stability but will undermine the 
effectiveness of the missile system to rapidly respond if required. Pre-delegation, on the other hand, 
will increase the risk of inadvertence. The command system will thus be under extreme stress if 
dispersal or deployment ever takes place. The principal decision-making problem is how to make an 
optimum trade-off between battle effectiveness and safety. The evolving national command systems 
will have to find an answer to this problem, which was not easily solved even during the Cold war. 
However, both countries have sufficient territorial space and variety of terrain for dispersal 
and concealment but the road network is not well developed in both countries. Conditions for mobility 
are harsh and compounded by generally hostile weather. Physical security of the weapons is not up to 
the mark. There are multiple modes for missile deployment each having its own unique problems of 
safety in movement. The variety of missiles available may further compound the safety issues of 
mating them with the warhead – both conventional and nuclear. Greater instability results when the 
potential operational problems of missiles just described are linked with the deployment of nuclear 
weapons. At least four major considerations will play into decisions by India and Pakistan to undertake 
nuclear deployment. 
3.1 Problem of Political and Technical Control 
Firstly, there is problem regarding political and technical control. The imperative for political 
control is critical and deployment will pose a major control challenge. To ensure survivability, there 
will be a tendency to deploy a large rather than a small proportion of the national nuclear arsenal. The 
command and control requirements are fundamentally the same for any number of deployed nuclear 
weapons. Dispersal may involve different configurations ranging from prepared nuclear weapons 
integrated with their delivery means to separated nuclear weapon components moving independently 
from delivery systems. Pressure on the command system to pre-delegate authority will rise as a crisis 
spirals. The political release to fire nuclear weapons could be technically controlled by incorporating 
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permissive action links (PALs) in weapons. A PAL is a coded switch that controls the arming of the 
weapon. PALs require the entry of a code in order to open circuits that arm the weapon. Even if PALs 
are used, the decision to delegate authority and release warheads to military units in the field will be 
excruciatingly difficult for both India and Pakistan. 
3.2 Problem of Communication 
Secondly, there is problem regarding communication. The essence of command and control is 
to have several layers of redundant communication to ensure effective assertive control. The absence of 
assured redundancy and secure communication will remain a prime concern. Overcoming electronic 
jamming in a conventional war, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects in the event of outbreak of a 
nuclear war, will be other critical needs.  
3.4 Challenge of Physical Security of Nuclear Weapons 
Thirdly, there is a Need for Physical Security of nuclear weapons. Though the possibility of 
nuclear weapons being stolen is remote, as multiple tiers of security will always be present, but 
concerns about safety and security will certainly grow during deployment. Deployment will increase 
the importance of physical control by the command system even if the use of control systems such as 
PALs is incorporated. 
3.4 International Criticism 
Fourthly, India and Pakistan will face international opprobrium if they opt to deploy nuclear 
weapons. Although the international community may have reluctantly accepted their possession of 
nuclear weapons, the transition to operational deployments will likely lead to sanctions and isolation. 
This factor is unique to South Asia and constrains the implementation of deterrence strategies by 
Pakistan and India. For example, during the Kargil conflict, reports that both countries had activated 
and deployed their nuclear missile forces triggered intense international pressure on both countries.
6
 
National actions, such as signaling, that play a role in deterrence strategy may thus be constrained by 
international pressure. In contrast, offensive conventional force deployments do not seem to engender 
the same level of concern in the international community.  
4. Technical Problems 
Beside the above said operational problems in South Asia, missiles themselves pose serious 
security problems due to their peculiar characteristics.  
4.1 Geographical Constraints 
Ballistic missiles represent the fastest means for delivery of weapons of mass destruction from 
one country to another. In a matter of few minutes, a missile can cover a distance of hundreds of 
kilometers (see table 1). Hence, these delivery systems themselves could become a source of tension 
and could by their nature and disposition increase the incentive to attack first in a crisis.
7
  
In case of South Asia, short range missiles can attack on national capitals of adversaries even 
less than five minutes leaving little time for warning and protective measures due to the close 
geographical proximity. Since geography is fixed, flight times only change as the targets and launch 
points change. There is some potential for relatively long-range missiles to be used against short-range 
targets by flying in a depressed trajectory mode and decreases the typical time of flight by 2 or 3 
minutes.
8
 The countries, India and Pakistan, share a nearly 3000 km land boundary, and cities such as 
Lahore and Amritsar are only tens of kilometers from the border. Islamabad is less than 100 km from 
the border and New Delhi is also less than 400 km from the border. Missile flight time is short, even 
reduced to less than five minutes to reach the destinations. Warning times are even less due to the time 
required for sensors to detect the missile during flight. Response times are further reduced because of 
delays in communicating to decision makers, assessing information, making decisions, and finally 
giving orders on how to respond. It is likely that this process might not be completed before a 
threatening missile has reached its target. It also may result in a launch-on-warning posture in which 
countries respond prematurely before having time to fully assess the warning information received. 
Though India has declared a no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons but Pakistan has not adopted such 
a policy due to perceived conventional military asymmetries. While there is an asymmetry in strategic 
depth between India and Pakistan, the fact that each country has critical assets near the border means 
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that they both face potentially short response times in the case of missile attacks which may prompt any 
side to take a quick but wrong decision which may escalate the war. 
4.2 Autonomy after Launch 
Autonomy after launch of a missile is another problem which has a negative impact on 
stability factor in the region. Once launched missiles are fully autonomous and cannot be recalled or 
diverted. The lack of control once a missile is launched means that the reliability of command and 
control system is crucial. In contrast, there are cases of manned aircraft being recalled or diverted to 
other targets during flight. During period of tension, an authorized or accidental launch might 
precipitate a conflict and hence has a negative effect on the stability of the region. 
Ambiguity regarding type of warhead mounted on a missile launched also creates the 
confusion among decision makers because government statements frequently describe a missile system 
as nuclear capable. This has resulted in the perception that ballistic missiles in the inventories of India 
and Pakistan have both conventional and nuclear warheads. Even if this is not the reality, the 
assumption on the receiving end will likely be that any missile launched against it must be carrying a 
nuclear warhead.
9
 Aircrafts have been used in a conventional role in South Asia during wars 
historically while ballistic missiles have never been used in any role. Thus aircraft, even if capable of 
carrying a nuclear warhead do not carry the same danger of misperception once detected. Ambiguity 
regarding the nature of the warhead is exacerbated by the operational requirement for opaqueness 
regarding the number and location of missiles. Short-range, conventionally armed, ballistic missiles 
could quite conceivably be used within the context of limited war. A dual nuclear-conventional capable 
system is therefore quite destabilizing because the opposing command systems will likely have little 
reliable information about its mission or nature of its warhead. Therefore, ambiguity about the type of a 
missile warhead strongly decreases the stability. 
4.3 Poor Early Warning System 
Due to the lack of sophisticated and up-to-date early warning systems the missile launch data 
can be misinterpreted and may result in nuclear escalation accidentally. Concerns over 
misinterpretation of missile launch data are real. During the cold war there were a number of incidents 
involving accidents and misinterpretations related to nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
10
 While 
there was a sufficient time in the context of longer range ICBM missile threats of USA and former 
USSR but such time would not be available with the short flight times associated with the Indian and 
Pakistani missiles. Moreover, there is evidence that neither India nor Pakistan has focused sufficiently 
on the danger that a missile test launch during a crisis could be misperceived as the start of a nuclear 
attack.  Though, there is an agreement as part of the Lahore accords in January 1999, to provide missile 
test launch advance notification, but even such an agreement is not a fool-proof solution. Moreover, 
both Pakistan and India appear to be planning to use their missile test facilities for actual nuclear 
weapons launches during war which further increases the confusion regarding the missile test perceived 
as real attack. 
5. Missile Defence 
 Apart from these technical issues, introduction of ballistic missile defence (BMD) in the 
region will pose certain other negative implications for the region. An Indian BMD system, whatever 
its shape and size, whatever its operational shortcomings, will have a major political and psychological 
impact on both Pakistan and China. Both Pakistan and China would respond to an Indian BMD by 
bringing quantitative and qualitative changes in their nuclear forces, deployment postures, and perhaps 
go for missile defence of their own. India would, in turn, be affected by a buildup of offensive weapons 
and technologies by Pakistan and China, and would have to enhance its own capabilities in response. 
This action-reaction spiral is likely to give rise to a regional arms race. 
   China, India and Pakistan are enmeshed in a complex three-cornered interaction with great 
potential for instability. China and India fought over their disputed boundaries in 1962, and India and 
Pakistan have gone to war three times, in 1948, 1965 and 1971 and a limited war in 1999. All three 
states share “lines of actual control” apart from the international borders. In this scenario, the 
introduction of missile defence will play a destabilizing role by disturbing existing patterns of 
deterrence. Although all three states pledge to minimum deterrence, leaders in all three capitals have 
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also said that deterrence is not a static concept; the requirements of each state would, therefore, depend 
on what the others are doing or might seek to do.
11
 
  The pursuit of missile defence system by India would increase the chances of conflict between 
India and Pakistan. The deployment of missile defence system, irrespective of whether it is effective or 
not, could create a false sense of security among political and military leadership of India and can 
invite military adventurism or even a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan particularly. India and 
Pakistan have already fought over the issue of Kashmir. In a region, where incidents like a terrorist 
attack on the Indian parliament in 2001 can become the reason for a massive buildup on Pakistani 
borders, introduction of missile defence would increase India’s inclination towards a more aggressive 
posture with possible disastrous consequences for the security and stability of the region. Missile 
defence would also put Pakistan at a disadvantage in a conventional conflict, while surveillance and 
radar components of missile defence systems would put India at an advantage.
12
 Thus, missile defence 
would also accentuate the conventional imbalance between India and Pakistan. 
  Moreover, possible changes in the deployment posture of China and an actual deployment of 
Pakistani nuclear arsenal would decrease the nuclear threshold between the three nuclear powers in the 
region. With less escalation ladders and even less decision making time, the chances of miscalculation 
and accidental nuclear war would increase. The chances of a calculated nuclear exchange would also 
increase. Missile defence system will also have a negative impact on arms control efforts. Transfer of 
BMD technologies from Washington to New Delhi or from Tel Aviv to New Delhi would violate 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) provisions.
13
 Missile defence would undermine regional 
and global nuclear arms control initiatives and reverse the process of reducing the number of Multiple 
Independently Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads in nuclear stockpiles. It would generally weaken 
China’s support for the CTBT, the MTCR, and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) 
negotiations. India and Pakistan would also reconsider their support for FMCT in their pursuit of 
increased number of nuclear weapons. Improvement of warhead designs by Pakistan might necessitate 
nuclear testing, disturbing the nuclear test ban between India and Pakistan, and would also lessen the 
chances of either India or Pakistan supporting the CTBT.
14
 China’s efforts to develop MIRV warheads 
would also require testing. The net effect would be to weaken the support for non-proliferation efforts 
in the region. 
The effect of these developments would be to fuel an arms race between the three nuclear 
powers in the region. Perhaps not an arms race in the real sense of the word, but it would mean having 
definitely more offensive arms and technologies in the region. Moreover, New Delhi’s deployment of 
missile defence technology is likely to jeopardize improved relations between India and China. It 
would also have a negative impact on the peace process between India and Pakistan. India’s move to 
counter Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent could also make the resolution of the Kashmir dispute more remote 
and greatly increase the chances of conflict over the issue. 
The social and economic development of the region would also be affected. A region that has 
high rate of poverty and is underdeveloped, increased spending on offensive and defensive weapons 
would further retard development and increase poverty. In addition, India’s social and economic 
development might be adversely affected if funding for missile defence is added to military 
expenditures. Pakistan would also have to increase its defence expenditure to compensate for 
qualitative and quantitative changes in its nuclear arsenal and forces. This would amount to 
unnecessary burden on economies of both the countries with diversion of resources from much-needed 
development. Hence, it can be said finally that missile progammes in South Asia have serious security 
implications both at regional and global level. 
6. Conclusion 
 The proliferation of numerous missiles and related technologies in South Asia is a growing 
concern for world community. These missiles have brought more insecurity and tension to the region 
instead of positive claims by proliferation optimists. India and Pakistan, the two countries of the region, 
are seriously engaged in revising and refining these delivery systems. Even the public support in these 
both countries has been increasing in favour of accelerating the development of ballistic and cruise 
missiles. But these systems pose a serious risk for safety and security of the region. Lack of advanced 
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early warning systems and geographical proximity of these to rivals are the main sources of security 
threats in the region. Problem of political and technical controls of missiles during launch, physical 
security of nuclear weapons, maintenance of communication during launch of missiles and missile test 
flights during the period of strained relations are some other challenges which need to be addressed. 
Introduction of ballistic missile defence systems in the region by India will further aggravate the 
situation in a negative sense. Moreover, the social and economic development of the region would also 
be affected by this costly arms race. Finally, as responsible nuclear neighbors, India and Pakistan need 
to carefully evaluate the impact of their growing ballistic missile capabilities and their missile 
management practices. In addition, both countries would be wise to consider establishing a ballistic 
missile restraint regime in the region. Restraint measures could improve national and regional security, 
while retaining the deterrent value of nuclear arsenals.   
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Table 1: Estimated Time Duration of Some Possible Missile Flights in South Asia 
Launch Point Target Distance   (km) Estimated Total  Flight 
times (minutes) 
Airbase Near Karachi Thiruvanatpuram 2000 13 
Sargodha Airbase Mumbai 1470 11 
Agra Airbase Karachi 1128 10 
Agra Airbase Lahore 608 8 
Sargodha Airbase New Delhi 581 8 
Depressed Trajectory 
Flight 
 600 5 
Source: Zia Mian, R Rajaraman and M V Ramana, “Early Warning in South Asia : Constraints and 
Implications,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 11, 2003, pp.109-150 
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